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Abstract
The goal of this piece is to put some pressure on Brian O’Shaughnessy’s claim that 
perceptual experiences are necessarily mental processes. The author targets two moti-
vations behind the development of that view. First, O’Shaughnessy resorts to pure con-
ceptual analysis to argue that perceptual experiences are processes. The author argues 
that this line of reasoning is inconclusive. Secondly, he repeatedly invokes a thought 
experiment concerning the total freeze of a subject’s experiential life. Even if this case 
is coherent, however, it does not show that perceptual experiences are processes.
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Although philosophical discussions concerning perceptual experiences are 
currently in good shape, it is still unclear what we talk about when we talk 
about perceptual experiences – that is, what kind of entities they are. 
Philosophers of perception are traditionally inclined to conceive them as men-
tal processes, but explicit reasons to endorse a processive view are hard to 
come across. An exception to this rule is Brian O’Shaughnessy, who argues for 
the claim that our perceptual experiences have to be analysed as irreducibly 
processive mental events. In this piece, I argue that two notorious motivations 
underpinning his processive stance are inconclusive. Although O’Shaughnessy 
also discusses a third and crucial set of considerations to the effect that per-
ceptual experience acquaints us with the passage of time, I shall bypass it here: 
his remarks based on the temporal phenomenology of experience deserve a 
subtler and more extended discussion than the one I could provide within 
the  limits of this piece. In this sense, my present goal is considerably more 
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modest: instead of developing an exhaustive critique, all I aim to do here is to 
address two sets of considerations from which O’Shaughnessy’s processive 
view gains much of its intuitive appeal.
The present task is divided into four sections. First, I turn to Zeno Vendler’s 
seminal work on the ontology of seeing, so as, first, to bring the notion of per-
ceptual experience a bit more into focus; secondly, to introduce an ontological 
framework like the one at stake in O’Shaughnessy’s discussion; and, thirdly, 
to frame my discussion of O’Shaugnessy’s work against the backdrop of a 
challenge posed by Vendler about the need of mental processes within an 
account of perceptual experiences. Secondly, I outline the core elements of 
O’Shaughnessy’s processive view of perceptual experiences. Thirdly, I move on 
to examine one motivation behind that position, namely, that pure conceptual 
analysis reveals that perceptual experiences must be understood as processes 
rather than states. I argue that this line of reasoning is inconclusive. Finally, I 
turn to an illustrative thought experiment concerning the total freeze of a 
mental life: as far as I can see, O’Shaughnessy takes this fiction precisely to 
illustrate that, since perceptual experiences fail to exist in circumstances 
where processes would fail to do so, it is extremely reasonable to conceive per-
ceptual experiences as mental processes. But I shall argue that this case does 
not entail that perceptual experiences are processes, but only highlights the 
dynamic character of perceptual phenomena.
1 Setting up the Ontological Question
As just anticipated, this section aims to set up the notion of perceptual experi-
ences within the context of a categorial framework exploited by Zeno Vendler 
(cf. Vendler 1957). Set against the background of a stative ontology of percep-
tion inspired by Vendler’s work, the import of O’Shaughnessy’s processive 
stance will become more transparent. To keep things relatively simple, I shall 
focus the present discussion on perceptual experiences in their visual modal-
ity and those experiential phenomena underpinning cases of veridical percep-
tion, not illusion or hallucination.
This piece is fundamentally concerned with the basic conscious or experien-
tial component at the heart of perception, as opposed to more cognitive-laden 
phenomena, such as perceptual attention or perceptual judgements. To begin 
putting this experiential ingredient into focus, consider an example inspired by 
the closing lines of Vendler’s seminal piece on verbs and times (cf. Vendler 1957, 
159–160). Imagine that a vigilant sailor (call him Jim) stands on deck and looks 
out for a particular star on a cloudy night: as the sky clears up, Jim spots the 
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celestial body, his gaze thereby remaining fixed on it from t1 to t10. If Jim 
 uninterruptedly sees a star from t1 to t10, he must visually experience it or be 
aware of it during that period of time:1 that is, if his visual field remains fixed dur-
ing that time, the relevant star will look or visually appear a certain way to him.
In the philosophical literature, it is customary to draw a line between seeing 
an object and being visually aware of an object. Sometimes, the following 
semantic fact is stressed: while a construction of the form ‘S sees O’ or ‘S sees 
that p’ is supposed to be factive in the sense that, if S sees O/that p, it follows 
that O exists/p is true; the more technical constructions ‘S visually experiences 
O’ and ‘S visually experiences that p’ do not entail O’s existence or p’s truth (cf. 
Crane 2005/2011, 2.1). Over and above this semantic difference, it has also been 
noted that a subject may have visual experiences of a given feature without 
seeing it (cf. Wolgast 1960, Lowe 1996, 92f.). The thought behind this remark is, 
I think, that visual experiences constitute a necessary but non-sufficient part 
of seeing. Perceptual experiences no doubt play a paramount role in our under-
standing of perception insofar as they pick up on the distinctive conscious 
component of perceptual phenomena. But, at the same time, it is also impor-
tant to acknowledge that they could be either veridical or hallucinatory, 
whereas perception is by definition a veridical or successful informational 
transaction between a subject and her actual surroundings.2
The previous distinction is relevant because Vendler is not as concerned 
with visual experiences as with seeing. In particular, he writes as follows:
A sailor on deck looking ahead remarks, “It is pitch dark, I don’t see any-
thing.” After a while, “Now I see a star.” We ask him, “What has happened?” 
1 A terminological note. In this essay, I take ‘experiencing’ and ‘being aware of ’ to be equiva-
lent: that is, I shall assume that having perceptual experiences of O consists in being aware of 
O, and vice versa.
2 Two points of clarification. First, I take an informational or causal understanding of percep-
tion to be something of a commonplace in the philosophical literature (cf. Armstrong 1968, 
209, 255; Pitcher 1971, 64, 113–130; Dretske 1981, O’Shaughnessy 2000, 38), this stance not being 
equivalent to a causal theory of perception (cf. Grice 1961, Steward 2011): after all, it is not 
committed to a reductive analysis of perception in purely causal terms. Secondly, the distinc-
tion at hand between experiencing and perceiving is not intended to clash with a disjunctiv-
ist view of experience. Conceiving visual experience as a necessary but non-sufficient 
component of seeing does not amount to conceiving it as a common psychological kind 
underpinning visual perception and hallucination. Or, to look at it the other way round, 
Disjunctivism does not deny that there is some description which may be satisfied by an 
episode of veridical perception and by its hallucinatory counterpart: it only challenges the 
thought that what makes that description true is a fundamental kind of mental phenomena 
common to perception and hallucination (cf. Crane 2005/2011, 3.4).
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“The cloud’s gone.” “But what else happened?” “Nothing else.” Of course 
many things happened in the world and in the sailor. But his seeing is not 
one of them. 
Vendler 1957, 160
In a nutshell, the thought seems to be that a description of a temporally protracted 
perceptual scenario – say, Jim’s seeing of a bright star from t1 to t10 – need not rely 
on the notion of a process of a special mental kind: in principle, it could make do 
with mental states, that is, the instantiation of a given property or relation.3 To 
begin with, Vendler explicitly recognizes that the existence of very complex phys-
ical and neuro-biological stories underlie the relevant description. To describe 
what happens when Jim perceives a star, one certainly has to identify the material 
substances and properties thus involved: Jim himself, a star, the latter’s luminous 
quality, etc. It is also necessary to provide a physical story concerning how infor-
mation about an object far away and possibly long gone may reach our planet in 
general and Jim in particular. Again, a neuro-biological description should spec-
ify how that information is processed by Jim’s retinae down into his primary visual 
cortex. Vendler does not deliver such stories, for it is not his philosophical duty to 
do so. In the present context, his main concern is our understanding of conscious 
perception in terms of general metaphysical categories familiar to philosophers, 
e.g. those of process and state. When he says that nothing happens in the sailor’s 
mind while perceiving the star, Vendler is by no means denying that Jim sees the 
star: what he contests is the propriety of conceiving Jim’s (or anybody’s) tempo-
rally extended seeing as a mental happening of a processive kind – in other words, 
as a mental process. According to Vendler, temporally extended seeing – that is, 
being perceptually aware of worldly items or states of affairs – should be under-
stood as the obtaining of a mental state (cf. Vendler 1957, 155–157).
Hence, Vendler’s remarks primarily concern the perceptual phenomenon of 
seeing. But, to the extent that there is an intimate relationship between seeing 
and visual experiences, those remarks could well have a bearing on our philo-
sophical understanding of the core conscious or experiential component 
underpinning that phenomenon. As Michael Tye puts it, it is natural to sup-
pose that ‘[s]eeing something entails the presence of a visual experience. 
I cannot see X unless X looks some way to me; and for X to look some way to me, 
it must cause in me a visual experience.’ (Tye 2003, 34–35) Since perceptual 
experiences typically involve a key component of perceptual phenomena, it is 
3 It is worth stressing that seeing in this temporally extended sense is not Ryle’s sense of seeing 
as an achievement – that is, as an instantaneous or punctual occurrence (cf. Ryle 1954). 
Vendler refers to the latter as seeing in the ‘spotting’ sense.
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natural to suppose that, to a greater or a lesser extent, a philosophical descrip-
tion of seeing will constrain a philosophical description of visual awareness. 
Now, whatever shape this deep and delicate link turns out to take, I shall 
depart from Vendler’s work at this point so as to focus the present discussion 
on visual experiences rather than seeing. More specifically, I am concerned 
with the basic ontological question what we talk about when we talk about per-
ceptual experiences, or what kind of items perceptual experiences are. To use the 
previous example, what is involved in Jim’s being aware of the star during t1–
t10? What exactly happens or obtains when Jim is perceptually conscious of 
his surroundings? Or again, to put the same question more bluntly, what 
kind  of things (in the broadest possible sense of the term) are Jim’s visual 
experiences?
In spite of my departure from Vendler’s work, I think it is a helpful starting-
point for at least two reasons. First, it highlights the possibility of addressing 
the above ontological question as a question about the temporal structure of 
perceptual experience. Secondly, it suggests an interesting challenge not only 
against a processive view of seeing, but also against one of visual experience. 
I say a bit more about both points next.
To begin with, then, processes and states pick up on worldly items with dif-
ferent temporal structures: that is, items which persist or fill time in different 
ways (cf. Vendler 1957, 143–149; Steward 1997, 73). This point is more delicate 
than it seems, for it is by no means obvious how both categories should be set 
apart: clean and heavy-duty criteria for the relevant distinction are hard to 
come by. For the time being, I shall rely on a widely known and shared formula-
tion of the relevant distinction: whereas processes occur, unfold, or take time, 
states only obtain or continue to obtain; whereas there are only parts of a pro-
cess at each moment before its completion, states exist wholly present, not 
only as parts, throughout the moments of time they obtain.
Vendler himself latches onto the relevant categories mainly via examples: in 
particular, he compares the processes of running and writing, on the one hand, 
and, on the other, the state of knowing (cf. Vendler 1957, 144–145). Indeed, run-
ning and writing are uncontroversially processes: they are temporally pro-
tracted in the sense that they go on, unfold, or take time. This point may also 
be put by saying that such processes have temporal phases or parts, parts 
which come into existence successively: when a subject runs or writes, her run-
ning or writing is not given as a whole at each of the instants throughout which 
she runs or writes; such processes come into existence successively until they 
terminate when the subject stops running or writing. States, by contrast, do not 
share the same mode of existence. Vendler grants that they are temporally pro-
tracted: ‘one can know or believe something, love or dominate somebody, for a 
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short or long period.’ (Vendler 1957, 146) Hence, the distinction between pro-
cesses and states is not a matter of temporal duration. For Vendler, instances of 
both categories may be temporally extended: but, while only processes go on, 
states obtain at a time and exist over time by being wholly present at each 
moment they obtain.4
But why are the categories of process and state supposed to have a bearing 
on an ontological analysis of perceptual experiences? As I previously men-
tioned, Vendler’s categories intend to pick up on different temporal schemata 
or structures: that is, they distinguish different ways in which an occurrence 
may exist or persist through time. The temporal character of the Vendlerian 
framework neatly links up with a venerable philosophical thought according 
to which our psychological lives allow for temporal categorization, an idea par-
ticularly salient in Kant’s understanding of time as a pure form of inner sense 
(cf. Kant 1781–1787/2003, A33/B49). Helen Steward rehearsed the latter point in 
terms of what she terms a temporal strategy for the study of mental ontology:
There is room for dispute about whether or not, and in what sense, men-
tal phenomena are physical, whether they are spatially located, and 
whether they have subjects, and if so, what those subjects might be. […] 
But there is no controversy about the temporality of mental phenomena – 
about the fact that they take place in, or persist through, time.’ 
Steward 1997, 75–76
While the ascription of temporal features to psychological phenomena 
may  also turn out to be controversial, it seems the safest starting-point for 
describing our mental reality in the most general ontological terms. Against 
4 Apart from Vendler’s discussion, these notions have a venerable history in the philosophical 
literature. There is a precedent at least in Aristotle’s Physics, Metaphysics, and Nichomachean 
Ethics (cf. Barnes 1984). In modern times, interest in the process-state divide has been 
renewed by the seminal contributions of Ryle, Vendler, and Anthony Kenny in the philoso-
phy of mind and the philosophy of action (cf. Ryle 1954, Vendler 1957, Kenny 1963, ch. 8). 
Since then, there has been a wave of contributions at the interface of linguistics and philoso-
phy (cf. Comrie 1976, Taylor 1977, Mourelatos 1978, Dowty 1979, Rothstein 2004, among many 
others). Meanwhile, the distinction has slowly made its come-back into hard-core philoso-
phies of mind, of perception, and action (cf. Steward 1997, Soteriou 2007, 2011, 2013; Crowther 
2009a, 2009b). That said, how one should set the category of process apart from that of states 
is a far from uncontroversial question. As far as I know, this is still an ongoing issue. For the 
time being, I have relied on Vendler’s broad characterization and examples of the relevant 
categories insofar as, at that level of generality, they do seem to provide a common ground 
among the different players in the current debate concerning the ontology of perception.
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this background, Vendler’s framework seems useful precisely because it pro-
vides an elegant tool for undertaking that temporal analysis. Perceptual experi-
ences are those conscious phenomena at the heart of perceptual episodes like 
seeing, hearing, etc.: when I see a bright star, I typically mean that I am visually 
aware of that distant object. Since a subject may perceive (i.e. see, hear, etc.) an 
object for a shorter or longer period of time, it is natural to think that the con-
scious or experiential phenomena at the heart of those episodes are tempo-
rally protracted too. Vendler’s framework is thus relevant in the present context 
because it provides a neat set of temporal concepts for the analysis of experi-
ential items which, if nothing else, at least seem to exist through time.
Vendler’s remarks also suggest an interesting challenge against a processive 
view of visual experience. As previously mentioned, Vendler develops a story 
where temporally extended seeing is conceived as a condition instantiated by 
a subject for a certain period of time, or, in other words, as a state obtaining (as 
opposed to unfolding) in a determinate subject.5 Since he takes the notions of 
process and state to be mutually exclusive, Vendler naturally criticizes a pro-
cessive view of seeing. In this piece, I shall not engage with Vendler’s reasons 
for a stative view of seeing or against its processive counterpart. What I wish to 
take on board here is the following idea: even if a processive view of seeing is 
internally coherent or otherwise appealing, it faces the question whether pro-
cesses of a special mental kind need be invoked in order to describe a temporally 
extended perceptual scenario. Recall that a key motivation behind Vendler’s 
analysis of seeing is the belief that nothing need happen in a subject’s mind 
when she is perceptually aware of her surroundings, in the sense that no spe-
cial mental processes have to be invoked to describe the mental life of some-
one like Jim during t1–t10 (cf. Vendler 1957, 159–160).6 True: many things happen 
in the world and in Jim’s head. Complex physical processes bridge the space 
5 With the process-state distinction at hand, another quick word on the relationship between 
seeing and experiencing. Suppose one holds Vendler’s view that seeing is a stative relation 
that obtains in a subject and one also holds that visual experiences constitute a necessary but 
non-sufficient part of seeing. Could one hold that seeing is stative but affirm that visual expe-
riences are processive? As far as I can see, one could. In fact, Matthew Soteriou, whose work 
I discuss elsewhere, endorses a hybrid position along such lines (cf. Soteriou 2011, 2013). But, 
while I thus concede that moves from ontological claims about seeing to ontological claims 
about visual experiences are not straightforward, I think it is plausible to read Vendler’s 
stative analysis as being mainly concerned with relations of visual awareness, that is, visual 
experiences.
6 This motivation seems to be a natural extension of Wittgenstein’s and Ryle’s attempts to 
undermine the unnecessary introduction of mental particulars into an ontology of the mind 
in order to account for thoughts, among other mental items (cf. Ryle 1949, Wittgenstein 1953). 
For other descendants of such critiques, cf. Ayer 1963, Kenny 1989, Travis 2001.
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and time between a bright star and Jim. Equally complex neurobiological or 
subpersonal processes come into play when Jim processes the relevant visual 
information. In addition to all of this, however, it is unclear that the very per-
ceptual phenomenon of Jim’s temporally extended seeing should be under-
stood as a processive item apart from those already invoked. To borrow D.M. 
Armstrong’s notion of state of affair (cf. Armstrong 1997, Thau 2002), for 
example, one could expand on Vendler’s stative story saying that Jim’s seeing 
simply consists in the instantiation of an informational relation between Jim 
and the relevant star – no special perceptual processes needed! On grounds of 
ontological – or at the very least categorial – simplicity, Vendler thus poses a 
challenge against the need for introducing special perceptual processes within 
a story of seeing.
Taking the previous line of reasoning one step farther, I think it suggests a 
structurally similar challenge against processive views of perceptual experi-
ences. Also taking the process-state distinction to be a mutually exclusive one 
within the realm of experiences, O’Shaughnessy sides with the processive 
camp. Furthermore, O’Shaughnessy’s view is precisely driven by the idea that a 
philosophical description of perceptual experiences cannot make do without 
a key processive component.
Vendler’s work thus provides two helpful resources for the critical assess-
ment of O’Shaughnessy’s process-based ontology of experience: on the one 
hand, it grounds the ontological question what kind of items perceptual expe-
riences are on a temporal framework apparently shared by O’Shaughnessy; 
and, on the other, it highlights a challenge from economy which the proces-
sive view of experience has to address sooner or later. Thus framing the 
present dialectic between both writers, my aim is to put some pressure on 
O’Shaughnessy’s stance by questioning the need for introducing mental pro-
cesses into an ontological characterization of perceptual experiences. In the 
next section, I unpack the gist of O’Shaughnessy’s position. Later on, I shall 
unpack and critically assess two reasons why he might intuitively take experi-
ential processes to be necessary within a story of perceptual phenomena.
2 O’Shaughnessy on the Necessity of Experiential Flux
For O’Shaughnessy, perception and action are varieties of experience (cf. 
O’Shaughnessy 2000, 38): as such, he does not think that all experiences are 
perceptual. This essay is only concerned with the perceptual variety. Within 
this context, a good starting point is the fact that, according to O’Shaughnessy, 
a crucial feature of perceptual experiences qua experiential is their essential or 
necessary dynamic character. Thus, he claims that, ‘[c]haracteristically the 
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contents of experience are in flux, and necessarily experience itself is in flux, 
being essentially occurrent in nature’ (O’Shaughnessy 2000, 43); or again, that 
‘[i]t is not the mere existence of flux […] in the case of experience that is dis-
tinctive: it is the necessity of flux.’ (O’Shaughnessy 2000, 44) This characteriza-
tion highlights two things: first, the dynamic or changing nature of perceptual 
experiences; and, secondly, the necessity of that character.
The relevant dynamic component translates into a processive conception of 
perceptual experiences, a view which O’Shaughnessy formulates as follows:
Yet even when experience is not changing in type or content, it still 
changes in another respect: it is constantly renewed, a new sector of itself 
is there and then taking place. This is because experiences are events 
(glimpsing, picture-painting) or processes (walking, picture-painting), 
and each momentary new element of any given experience is a further 
happening or occurrence (by contrast with (say) the steady continuation 
through time of one’s knowing that 9 and 5 make 14). Thus, even if I am 
staring fixedly at some unchanging material object, such staring is not 
merely a continuous existent across time, it is an activity and therefore also 
a process, and thus occurrently renewed in each instant in which it contin-
ues to exist. In short, the domain of experience is essentially a domain of 
occurrences, of processes and events. 
O’Shaughnessy 2000, 42
This statement aligns with what I have already said about the processive 
view.  According to O’Shaughnessy, perceptual experiences are temporally 
extended events or happenings: such events are temporally structured in 
the sense that they have a beginning, a middle, and an end. More importantly, 
these happenings are of a processive kind, that is, they go on for a certain 
period of time. Thus, if Jim sees a bright star from t1 to t10, a perceptual 
event constituted by a mental process extending from t1 to t10 takes place in 
his mind.
In the previous quote, it is also clear that O’Shaughnessy takes the notion of 
perceptual process to be intimately related to that of perceptual event: after 
all, he claims that perceptual awareness may be conceived in terms of pro-
cesses and events. Both ontological categories are not equivalent, but they are 
closely related. Expanding on this relationship, he writes:
[…] when a process comes to a halt (at whatever point) an event is at 
that moment realized (a dissolving, a skid, an ascent), so that we may say 
at each new instant tx of an unfolding process that a potential event 
enduring from to–tx has occurred by the time tx. […] Thus, the process 
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‘lays down’ more and more of an event the same in kind as itself, and may 
in this regard be taken to be the very stuff or phenomenal matter of 
events the same in kind as itself.
O’Shaughnessy 2000, 447
According to this passage, events are complete only when processes conclude. 
Since parts of a potential event come into existence – that is, are realized – as 
its constituting process unfolds, one might actually say that an ongoing pro-
cess is an incomplete event. A complete event is, in turn, a process that has 
already stopped. Indeed, it seems natural to claim that a certain event, the 
Battle of Trafalgar, began at 11:45 on Oct. 21, 1805 and ended five hours later: at 
each moment, the fighting through which the battle was successfully realized 
was going on. This suggests that, although intimately related, events and pro-
cesses constitute different ontological categories.
A fairly popular take on the present point is that events are related to processes 
via the notion of constitution: just as count-quantifiable, spatial entities (e.g. a 
statue, a tree, etc.) are constituted or realized by mass-quantifiable stuff (e.g. 
wood, bronze, etc.), certain events should be conceived as count-quantifiable, 
temporally extended items which are made of or constituted by mass-quantifi-
able processes (cf. Armstrong 1968, 131; Steward 1997, 94–97; Crowther 2011). 
While temporally extended events may be understood as temporal particulars – 
that is, they exist in time, are temporally structured and count-quantifiable – pro-
cesses may be conceived as the matter or stuff out of which such particulars are 
constituted. This suggestion is attractive because it captures intuitive contrasts 
between the notions of process and event: processes, not events, go on; process-
talk allows for adjective or adverbial qualifications which event-talk does not – 
for example, the humming of my computer may be persistent or continuous (cf. 
Steward 1997, 95); unlike processes, events do not stop but only come to an 
end (cf. Steward 1997, 95); events are count-quantifiable – we can speak, for 
example, of one or two songs, of one or two battles – whereas processes are 
only mass-quantifiable – there is not one or two hummings, one or two run-
nings, but only more or less humming, more or less running (cf. Steward 1997, 
96–97; Crowther 2011). In line with these remarks, O’Shaughnessy himself caps 
the previously quoted passage by saying that perceptual processes are ‘the very 
stuff or phenomenal matter of events’.
7 A bit earlier, he also writes: ‘when a process terminates, an event of the same type is its neces-
sary residue. If I have been looking steadily at a painting for ninety seconds, if for ninety 
seconds such a processive activity was going on, then at the end of that interval it became 
true that I had looked at that painting, it became true that an act-event of that type and dura-
tion had occurred.’ (O’Shaughnessy 2000, 43).
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That said, the relevant processive view also contains a modal qualification 
which is crucial for understanding what kind of perceptual processes, and 
hence events, are at stake. As stated at the beginning of this section, 
O’Shaughnessy thinks that perceptual experiences are necessarily or essen-
tially processive. Why? Because he conceives them as processive or occurrent 
‘to the core’ (O’Shaughnessy 2000, 49). To highlight this point, he draws a line 
between experiences, on the one hand, and, on the other, non-experiences or 
‘the sector that encompasses the relatively stable unexperienced mental foun-
dation (e.g. cognitive, evaluative, etc.) upon which experience occurs.’ 
(O’Shaughnessy 2000, 42–43) The relevant contrast is not one between a 
dynamic and a static sector of the mind. After all, changes can take place among 
non-experiential states: for example, our beliefs or memories can change over 
time. The crucial point is not merely that perceptual experiences involve 
change, for non-experiential states do so as well. The thought is that experi-
ences are processive down to their ultimate parts: no matter how you go about 
analysing perceptual awareness, you always end up with processes. By thus 
expanding on the processive view, O’Shaughnessy comes to share a claim sug-
gested by Vendler, namely, that perceptual processes and perceptual states are 
mutually incompatible. Let me expand on this point.
Throughout the defence of his processive stance, O’Shaughnessy raises the 
question whether perceptual experiences could allow for a dual ontological anal-
ysis, that is, whether they could be analysed in stative as well as processive terms 
(cf. O’Shaughnessy 2000, 46). This possibility is suggested by the fact that physical 
as well as psychological but non-experiential processes may be so analysed (cf. 
O’Shaughnessy 2000, 44–47). For example, O’Shaughnessy concedes that certain 
movements across space may be conceived as processes constituted by objects 
standing in certain states: ‘constituting a process like moving out of states like 
being at a position in space at a particular time, is not in competition with consti-
tuting such a process out of parts the same in kind as itself.’ (O’Shaughnessy 2000, 
45) The point is not that either analysis is acceptable, but that it is necessary to 
invoke both process-parts and state-parts in order to capture the kind of events or 
changes that certain movements across space are. Again, some psychological 
albeit non-experiential phenomena (e.g. certain instances of forgetting, coming 
to understand, or deciding) also seem to be processes with states at their core. 
O’Shaughnessy by no means thinks that physical and psychological but non-
experiential change will always be processive: according to him, processes in 
general are changes always exhibiting some form of continuity among their con-
stituting parts (cf. O’Shaughnessy 2000, 47), but instances of changes like move-
ment across space, forgetting, and deciding, may be either continuous or 
discontinuous. Physical and  psychological but non-experiential changes involve 
a processive and a stative analysis only when they are temporally continuous.
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But what about experiential processes? Could they also be analysed in terms 
of processes involving temporally continuous state-parts? According to 
O’Shaughnessy, they could not: he argues that psychological states cannot be 
constitutive components of perceptual experiences (cf. O’Shaughnessy 2000, 
44, 47), and it should be relatively clear that this negative claim is related to the 
irreducibly processive character of experiential flux: after all, if experiences are 
irreducibly processive – that is, if they are processive or occurrent to the core – 
they could not be analysed into stative components; mental states cannot 
underpin experiences because these psychological phenomena are necessarily 
processive. O’Shaughnessy goes as far as saying that the absence of such under-
pinning states constitutes ‘a fundamental differentia of the whole experience 
genus’ (O’Shaughnessy 2000, 44). Indeed, states may lie at the heart of physical 
and non-experiential processes, but that is so only because such changes are 
not processive through and through. According to O’Shaughnessy, however, 
there are no experiential states.
To motivate his view on perceptual experiences, O’Shaughnessy relies to a 
greater or a lesser extent on at least two motivations: on the one hand, he 
thinks that a head-on analysis of the concept of experience vindicates expe-
riential processes over experiential states; and, on the other, he invokes a 
thought-experiment – viz. a case of ‘total mental freeze’ – the purpose of 
which is to highlight the necessary dynamic character of perceptual phenom-
ena and, accordingly, the obvious appeal of a processive view. O’Shaughnessy 
takes the correctness of his processive view to count against a stative posi-
tion. As I have previously noted, the goal of this piece is not to argue for a 
stative view, but only to show that the previous motivations are far from 
uncontroversial.
3 The Anatomy of Experience
To begin with, O’Shaughnessy argues that perceptual experiences could not 
be conceptually analysed or anatomized in terms of temporally continuous 
transitions from state to state, but only in terms of processes. The modal 
qualification of this statement is important: O’Shaughnessy’s claim is not just 
that perceptual experiences may be analysed along processive lines, but that 
they have to insofar as they are occurrent to the core. Since my target is only 
the modally stronger claim, the present section strives to show that 
O’Shaughnessy has not said enough to rule out an alternative analysis of per-
ceptual experiences.
Since O’Shaughnessy focuses on undermining the stative view, his argu-
mentative strategy is to a good extent negative. He writes:
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[…] one is inclined to believe that (say) hearing a sound consists in the 
obtaining of a relation, that of awareness, between a mind and a sound. 
Accordingly, one might suppose that there exists an experience which is 
the realization in time of a state, viz. the relation of awareness between a 
mind and a sound. This is to strictly model ‘He hears the sound’ upon ‘He 
touches the wall’. But ‘He touches the wall’ is ambiguous between an 
event consisting in the establishing of a relation, and the relation itself. 
By contrast, ‘He hears the sound’ exhibits no such ambiguity: it describes 
an event, and never designates a relation. A fortiori the event of hearing a 
sound does not consist in the realization at or over a time of a relation of 
hearing the sound. This event occurs at an instant if the sound is instan-
taneous, and over an interval if the sound is temporally extended; then in 
the latter case it will need to be renewed instant by succeeding instant, as 
happens when listening is going on. 
O’Shaughnessy 2000, 49
In the present context, O’Shaughnessy conceives ‘relations of awareness’ as 
states in which subjects may stand relative to their surroundings: this is, I sus-
pect, why he denies that perceptual experiences pick up on such relations. As 
such, the question to evaluate here is whether O’Shaughnessy conclusively 
shows that the notion of perceptual experience should necessarily be analysed 
in terms of mental processes, as opposed to relations of perceptual awareness. 
My answer will be negative, and, as a result of that, I conclude that the present 
motivation is unsatisfactory.
Turning to the previous question, consider a construction of the following 
form:
(i) S perceives O (as F),
where ‘perceives’ could be replaced by ‘sees’, ‘hears’, ‘smells’, etc.
If there are any linguistic constructions we use to pick up on perceptual 
experiences, (i) seems a good candidate.
O’Shaughnessy specifically tries to drive an asymmetry between statements 
concerning hearing and touch. According to him, the reference of a perceptual 
statement like
(ii) He touches the wall,
is ambiguous between a durationless event – the touching of a wall at an 
instant – and a state – that is, the state in which a subject stands vis-à-vis the 
object (i.e. the wall) he is in direct contact with. Although I think that (ii) could 
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be read as a statement of tactile perception (cf. Armstrong 1962, Martin 1995, 
Bermúdez 1998, de Vignemont 2011), the most charitable reading in the present 
context seems to be that it concerns a physical relation which may obtain even 
in the absence of tactile perception, as when a plant or a rock touches a wall.
The suggestion which O’Shaughnessy tries to counteract is that one could 
apply a similar analysis to statements concerning perceptual phenomena. To 
undercut this move, O’Shaughnessy contends that a statement of auditory per-
ception, such as
(i*) He hears the sound,
is not ambiguous: on the contrary, it unequivocally points to a single reading 
where, at least as far as hearing temporally extended sounds is concerned, 
the subject’s hearing should be understood in processive terms. Although 
O’Shaughnessy does not generalize this claim to statements of other sensory 
modalities, one would expect him to do so for the sake of the processive view.
That said, I do not think that the previous line of reasoning conclusively 
shows that perceptual experiences have to be analysed along processive lines: 
for, on the one hand, an alternative (specifically, a stative) analysis of percep-
tual statements also seems initially plausible; and, on the other, it is unclear 
that constructions like (i*) actually demand the introduction of a processive 
component.
Turning to the first point, reflection on our pre-theoretical uses of perceptual 
verbs actually suggests that (i*) and (ii) resemble each other more than 
O’Shaughnessy allows. When Jim claims ‘I see it [i.e. the star]’, he may naturally 
be taken to refer either to the durationless event of spotting a star or to the tem-
porally extended occurrence of being aware of the star between t1 and t10. Over 
and above a description of our ordinary linguistic practices, Vendler’s work on 
seeing also suggests an alternative way of categorizing perceptual experiences. 
As I previously explained, the basic thought was that visual awareness could be 
understood as a state obtaining in a determinate subject: or, to use 
O’Shaughnessy’s terminology, one could conceive visual experiences as rela-
tions of awareness instantiated by a subject and her surroundings. This concep-
tion is, I think, appealing insofar as it draws from a familiar understanding of 
experiences as being open to the world: indeed, experiences are naturally taken 
to constitute a fundamental means for being in contact with the external world, 
for retrieving information for cognitive processing downstream perception. 
Thus conceived, perceptual experiences do not seem to be all that conceptually 
different from tactile phenomena of the sort expressed in (ii): that is, it does not 
seem counterintuitive to analyse statements of the form (i) along the stative 
lines which, as O’Shaughnessy concedes, the analysis of (ii) follows. These brief 
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remarks are of course not intended to vindicate a stative analysis of (i*): all I 
thereby aim to show is that O’Shaughnessy’s strong modal claim is not obvi-
ously true. Recall that he argues for the claim that perceptual experiences nec-
essarily demand a processive account: according to him, they have to be 
analysed along processive lines. The point I am trying to make now is just that, 
to the extent that he does not say enough to undermine what is an otherwise 
intuitive analysis of experience, O’Shaughnessy has to say much more in order 
to show that statements of perceptual experiences cannot be analysed in any 
but processive terms.
In addition to the previous point, it is not even obvious that O’Shaughnessy’s 
analysis of (i*) is correct: more specifically, his inference to the claim that 
statements about auditory perception refer to experiential processes seems 
problematic. At a crucial point in the above quoted passage, O’Shaughnessy 
claims that ‘the event of hearing a sound […] occurs at an instant if the sound 
is instantaneous, and over an interval if the sound is temporally extended’. I 
am ready to concede a number of things here. To begin with, I grant that a 
subject may perceive processes, e.g. when she perceives a temporally extended 
sound. Again, I also admit that a subject’s visual experiences tend to be tem-
porally extended. Finally, I could concede that there is a natural if broad 
sense in which the length of an experience in objective time depends on the 
length of the perceived item in objective time. But does any of this entail that, 
in addition to a perceived process (say, a temporally extended sound) and the 
neuro-biological or sub-personal processes taking place in a subject when she 
perceives a process over a period of time, there is a process of an entirely dif-
ferent kind – presumably, a phenomenally conscious one – taking place in 
the subject’s mind? I do not think so. Everything O’Shaughnessy has estab-
lished thus far is that a subject may perceive processes or otherwise tempo-
rally extended items, and that, to perceive such objects, she has to be aware 
of them for as long as they take. But these facts also seem to be compatible 
with a stative view of experience, for perceptual states no less than percep-
tual processes can be temporally extended. If hearing a temporally extended 
sound may be understood in terms of a relation of awareness between a sub-
ject and a worldly item, as a way of being in touch with the world, it is thus 
unclear that hearing something has to be extended in time by unfolding or by 
taking time.
O’Shaughnessy, meanwhile, asks us to believe something far stronger: the 
suggestion is that perceptual experiences have the exact same temporal struc-
ture as the processes a subject would perceive. In fact, if we bear in mind that 
experiences are supposed to be processive to the core, he is endowing percep-
tual experiences with a temporal structure that no physical or sub-personal 
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process quite shares. Since a subject may be perceptually aware of processes – 
say, a temporally extended sound or a jogger’s running across the park – 
O’Shaughnessy assumes that the corresponding episode of temporally extended 
perceptual awareness must be processive. To reach the desired conclusion, he 
perhaps presupposes a principle to the effect that the temporal features of rep-
resented items have to be ascribed to the corresponding vehicles of representa-
tion. This seems unlikely, though. Furthermore, Daniel Dennett has persuasively 
argued that a principle along such lines is far from uncontroversial (cf. Dennett 
1991). O’Shaughnessy’s move is controversial to the extent that all he says about 
the analysis of temporally extended episodes of perceptual awareness could be 
accommodated by something like Vendler’s stative view of experience. This is 
certainly a delicate issue I cannot settle here. For the time being, it is enough to 
flag it as an important complication in O’Shaughnessy’s line of reasoning. This 
alone, I think, shows that O’Shaughnessy’s modally strong reliance on percep-
tual processes is controversial.
In short, O’Shaughnessy’s conceptual analysis of perceptual experiences 
does not conclusively show that perceptual experiences have to be analysed as 
mental processes.
4 Freezing our Mental Lives
A second motivation behind O’Shaughnessy’s processive view concerns the 
alleged difference between ‘the characters and conditions of identity’ 
(O’Shaughnessy 2000, 44) of experiences and non-experiences. The general 
thought is, I think, that perceptual experiences fail to exist in circumstances 
where processes would fail to do so, and so, that it is extremely reasonable to 
conceive perceptual experiences as mental processes. To spell this point out, 
O’Shaughnessy invokes the following thought experiment:
[…] the domain of experience is essentially a domain of occurrences, of 
processes and events. In this regard we should contrast the domain of expe-
rience with the other great half of the mind: the non-experiential half. That 
is, the sector that encompasses the relatively stable unexperienced mental 
foundation (e.g. cognitive, evaluative, etc.) upon which experience occurs. 
While many of the non-experiential contents of this domain could con-
tinue in existence when all mental phenomena had frozen in their tracks, 
say (fancifully) in a being in suspended animation at 0° Absolute, those in 
the experiential domain could not. 
O’Shaughnessy 2000, 42–43
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According to this fiction, the mental life of a subject is frozen in a way which is 
intended to highlight different circumstances or conditions under which expe-
riences and non-experiences may exist: unlike experiences (e.g. perceptual 
experiences), non-experiences (e.g. beliefs) could exist in a frozen mental life, 
that is, a life where no mental changes take place. In the light of their distinc-
tive dynamic character, experiences are naturally classified as processes. As 
stressed by O’Shaughnessy, the relevant psychological contrast is one between 
a sector of the mind irreducible to non-processive components and a sector of 
the mind ultimately reducible to non-dynamic elements (i.e. state-parts).
An initial worry about this fiction is whether it is actually obvious that one 
could ascribe non-experiential states (say, beliefs) to a subject in total mental 
freeze – after all, this fiction comes close to a case of brain death, where it is not 
implausible to deny cognitive states to the relevant subject. Furthermore, the 
uses of ‘can’-terms are complex enough to raise the question whether the sense 
in which a subject in total mental freeze could have cognitive states is the same 
sense as that in which a sleeper or otherwise unconscious person could do so. 
I admit, though, that this line of attack is extremely delicate, so I present it only 
as a tentative suggestion. The line of criticism I shall pursue here is that, since 
O’Shaughnessy’s thought experiment could be accommodated within a stative 
conception of experience, it is unclear why the idea of mental freeze forces a 
processive view upon us. That is, I shall grant that a subject in mental freeze 
could have a non-experiential life while lacking an experiential one. Much 
more importantly, I agree with O’Shaughnessy that a frozen mental life is one 
where perceptual experiences cannot exist. Although he grounds this point on 
the allegedly processive character of experience, one could independently 
motivate it by recognizing that, if perceptual experiences constitute a key 
informational channel between mind and world, a frozen mental life – as it 
were, one in informational lockdown vis-à-vis its environs – is one where a 
subject does not engage in live transactions with her surroundings; that is, one 
where perceptual experiences cannot take place. Now, my point is that deny-
ing the existence of perceptual experiences in cases of mental freeze does not 
entail that perceptual experiences are mental processes.8
8 An anonymous reviewer suggested that one does not provide a counterexample to 
O’Shaughnessy’s reasoning from mental freeze by simply showing how we can make sense of 
the idea that there can be states that cannot obtain in the condition of mental freeze: instead, 
one would rather need to give an example of an experience that would not cease to exist in 
the condition of mental freeze. This point gives me the opportunity to stress the remarks 
I have made in the present paragraph: my intention is not to provide counterexamples to 
the case of mental freeze – I have just conceded that O’Shaughnessy’s construction is inter-
nally coherent – but to put pressure on the transition from that thought experiment to a 
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The previous line of objection may be supported in two related ways. First, 
one could hold that O’Shaughnessy’s thought experiment does not show that 
experiences are ultimately processive, but only that experiences and non-
experiences constitute different kinds of states – that is, kinds of states which 
have different identity conditions. One would certainly have to motivate this 
line of reasoning, but it seems a promising option.9
Secondly, one could hold that O’Shaughnessy’s fiction does not show that 
experiences are mental processes, but only that they somehow depend on pro-
cesses of different kinds. In a slogan, the relevant case only shows: no changes 
whatsoever, no experiences. But it fails to show, first, that there is a one-on-one 
mapping between experiences and processes, and, secondly, that the relevant 
processes are of a specific mental kind. To secure a processive conception, 
O’Shaughnessy needs to secure these two points: since his thought experiment 
fails to do so, he fails to secure a processive view.
To illustrate the previous remarks, let’s assume that perceptual experiences 
are mental states, and then determine whether one could still make sense of 
O’Shaughnessy’s mental-freeze case. The subjects of these experiences have 
bodies which, in turn, implement sensory systems from which perceptual expe-
riences will ensue: as such, one could reasonably suppose that a complex num-
ber of physiological processes take place in the relevant perceivers. On the basis 
of these stipulations, the suggestion is that the case of total mental freeze could 
be accommodated by a stative understanding of perceptual experiences. The 
reason why this is so is that, although perceptual experiences would not be pro-
cesses, they could be states that in turn depend on processes of a different (spe-
cifically, a non-experiential) kind. The sort of dependence at stake would not be 
causal, or at least not merely causal: crucially, I am inclined to think that such 
states would constitutively depend on processes; the relevant processes would 
be constitutive elements of perceptual states.10 The idea of a process-dependent 
state is not really exotic, for there are familiar examples of mental states which 
depend on physiological processes: for instance, being in pain or feeling anxious 
are mental states that depend on physiological changes. In these cases, no men-
tal processes (say, pain- or anxiety-processes) are involved.
 processive view. To show the latter, I shall presently argue that a condition of mental freeze 
could be made sense of even if perceptual experiences turned out to be mental states.
9 I attempt to provide such a motivation in a different piece. For the time being, the point 
is only that there could be a conceptual framework within which it would not be compul-
sory to infer a processive view of experience from the case of total mental freeze, and that 
the suggestion is not apparently contradictory.
10 A notion of process-dependent states along these lines figures in the writings of Matthew 
Soteriou and Thomas Crowther (cf. Soteriou 2007, 2011, 2013; Crowther 2009b). I discuss 
their work elsewhere.
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Now, to the extent that the condition of total freeze could obliterate not 
only subjective processes, but also subjective process-dependent states, a sub-
ject could thereby fail to have perceptual experiences not only when the latter 
are conceived as processes, but also when conceived as process-dependent 
states. Although O’Shaughnessy is rather obscure on this point, I take it that a 
world where a perceiver’s mental life is frozen has to be one where the psycho-
physical basis of her experiences is (totally or partially) in standstill too: this is, 
I presume, what would account for the subject’s being experientially cut off 
from her surroundings. In that world, freezing the physical basis of perceptual 
phenomena would also undermine the mental states which it grounds. The 
general notion of process would still have a role to play in the relevant sce-
nario, but it does not follow that experiences have to be happenings of a spe-
cial processive kind. So, I grant that O’Shaughnessy may illustrate a significant 
difference by means of the discussed thought experiment, but I do not think it 
forces a processive view of experience on us.
Before concluding, it is necessary to flag one last, important issue. Could 
O’Shaughnessy not argue that the case of total mental freeze is supposed to be 
based on our first-person introspective or otherwise phenomenological intu-
itions about visual experiences? That being the case, he could go on to argue 
that even if it is true that perceptual experiences are states which constitu-
tively depend on processes my foregoing remarks would not invalidate the 
introspective or phenomenological data and the philosophical view of experi-
ence thereby derived.11 This suggestion is extremely important, for it leads to a 
line of reasoning which independently fuels processive accounts of experi-
ences. O’Shaughnessy, for example, apparently grounds his own version of the 
processive view on the fact that perceptual experience acquaints us with the 
passage of time or the constant change of the present (cf. O’Shaughnessy 2000, 
49f.). Again, Matthew Soteriou argues that phenomenally conscious processes 
nicely accommodate the temporal transparency and the apparent temporal 
continuity of perceptual experiences (cf. Soteriou 2011, 2013). Neither line of 
reasoning depends on an analysis of the concept of experience or the interpre-
tation of the mental freeze case, so they are not touched by my foregoing cri-
tique. That said, they are extremely delicate insofar as they presuppose answers 
to paramount and extremely difficult questions such as ‘What features, if any, 
are involved in the temporal phenomenology of perceptual experiences?’, 
‘What and how such phenomenal features are introspectively accessible to 
their subjects?’, ‘What does the temporal structure of experiential content tell 
us about the temporal structure of their experiential vehicles – of experiences 
themselves, as it were?’, among others. Since these issues unfortunately escape 
11 I thank two anonymous referees for pressing the importance of this issue.
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the scope of this piece, I discuss them elsewhere. For the time being, all I can 
do here is to voice the general stance I aim to pursue in relation to this line of 
reasoning. In broad lines, I do not think that introspective or phenomenologi-
cal data could determine how perceptual experiences should be ontologically 
classified: in principle, those phenomenological features seem to be neutral 
regarding the question which ontology of perception we should endorse. To 
support this point, I show elsewhere that a stative view could also accommo-
date the relevant phenomenological facts. So, just as O’Shaughnessy claims at 
one point that the notion of experience is not a provider of ontological or cat-
egorial status to the psychological tokens falling under that concept (cf. 
O’Shaughnessy 2000, 41–42), I doubt that introspecting our perceptual experi-
ences actually tells us much about what kind of things they are. It is already 
controversial that introspective or phenomenological data tell us something 
about the worldly items we perceive. Whether they unveil the ontological 
structure of experiential items themselves – either a processive or a stative 
structure – is a different, and even more controversial, issue.
To sum up. In this section, I turned to O’Shaughnessy’s view of perceptual 
experience, for it constitutes one of the most systematic and radical defences of 
the processive stance. After unpacking it, I went on to examine two initial moti-
vations behind that position. Pure conceptual analysis and reflection on the case 
of total mental freeze seem to have a lot of pull when it comes to motivate the 
initial plausibility of the view that perceptual experiences are processive through 
and through. But, as far as I can see, such considerations are far from unproblem-
atic. If my critical remarks are correct, they do not undermine O’Shaughnessy’s 
overall project: after all, as I just explained, it could still fall back on consider-
ations concerning the temporal content of perceptual experiences. However, 
they do counteract considerations which may naturally predispose us to take a 
processive view for granted or to deem a stative view as a nonstarter.
5 Conclusion
In this piece, I examined O’Shaughnessy’s work so as to seek intuitive reasons 
in support of a processive view of perceptual experiences. After clarifying the 
import of the latter position within the ontological landscape outlined by 
Zeno Vendler, I turned to a critical assessment of two motivations – that is, 
conceptual analysis and the case of total mental freeze – behind O’Shaughnessy’s 
processive stance. As far as I can see, the intuitive appeal of the target position 
is far from unproblematic. That being the case, the question I began this essay 
with stands: what do we talk about when we talk about experiences? Further 
questions remain open. Throughout this piece, for example, I hinted at the 
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possibility of conceiving the relevant psychological category in terms of men-
tal states. This suggestion is worth exploring, and I pursue it elsewhere.
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